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The “Decentralization Theorem” (Oates, 1972) is central to the discussion of fiscal 
federalism. We revisit the role of consumption spillovers in evaluating the merits of 
(de)centralization. Unlike the general prediction, a higher degree of spillovers may reduce the 
difference in utility of centralization and decentralization. The non-monotonicity result relates 
to the difference in expenditures on public consumption. Provided decentralized choices yield 
higher levels of public expenditure, a rise in the amount of spillovers allows residents to enjoy 
larger gains in public consumption (and thereby utility) under decentralization relative to 
centralization. 
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The question of whether ¯scal responsibilities should be assigned to a (de)centralized author-
ity has long been debated in public economics. The discussion refers to Oates' Decentraliza-
tion Theorem (Oates, 1972) stating that in the absence of cost savings from centralization and
interjurisdictional externalities, ¯scal responsibilities should be decentralized. This argument
implicitly assumes that the center is unresponsive to preference heterogeneity and thereby
is only able to implement uniform policies. More speci¯cally, \[....] individual local govern-
ments are presumably much closer to the people [....], they posses knowledge of both local
preferences and cost conditions that a central agency is unlikely to have" (Oates, 1999, p.
1123).1 If the geographical scope of a jurisdiction falls short of the spatial pattern of spending
bene¯ts, the optimal assignment of policy tasks is deduced by trading o® the welfare costs of
policy uniformity against the welfare gains from internalizing spillovers in policy-making.2
Consider a country consisting of two regions which di®er in their preferences for local
public goods, which exhibit regional spillovers. In this setting, ¯scal decentralization allows
for a better matching of public good provision to local tastes, whereas under centralization
uniform provision ignores local taste heterogeneity, but internalizes spillovers. The central
question to be examined in this paper is how the di®erence in the utility of centralization
and decentralization changes with respect to the level of consumption spillovers.3 Using
quasi-linear, iso-elastic preferences, the welfare di®erence turns out to be non-monotone in
the strength of spillovers. A larger amount of spillovers may reduce the welfare di®erential
between centralization and decentralization. The rationale for this result is that decentral-
ization may yield higher expenditures on public goods than centralization. In fact, more
1The failure to adapt to taste di®erences is central to recent analyses of ¯scal federalism - see e.g. Alesina
and Spolaore (1997), Bolton and Roland (1997), Tabellini (2003), Brueckner (2004), Alesina et al. (2005),
and Brueckner (2006).
2The posited trade-o® is the essence of much of the discussion not only related to ¯scal unions, but also to
monetary unions and free-trade areas; see e.g. Alesina and Barro (2002).
3In general, two types of welfare comparisons can be distinguished. The ¯rst type looks at the welfare
di®erence as a function of spillovers irrespectively of the sign of the di®erence. The second type con¯nes its
attention to spill-over values at which the sign of the welfare di®erential changes. The paper primarily deals
with the former.
2resources are spent on public goods under decentralized decision-making when spillovers are
not too large and the demand for public consumption is su±ciently elastic. In this case, a
rise in spillovers gives residents higher utility gains when ¯scal authority is decentralized, due
to the fact that the higher decentral spending allows residents to enjoy a larger increase in
public consumption (and thereby utility) in response to a hike in the level of spillovers. The
¯nding may be unexpected given the virtue of centralization to internalize spillovers.
We further show that a non-monotonicity of the welfare di®erence only arise when decen-
tralization yields higher welfare. As such, an increase in the amount of spillovers reinforces
the welfare-superiority of decentralized decision-making, but, more importantly, will not jus-
tify a reassignment of ¯scal authority from the central level to the regional level. Hence, the
paper's ¯nding does not invalidate the bottom line of the \Decentralization Theorem" that
centralization (decentralization) yields higher welfare when spillovers are su±ciently high
(low).
To the best of our knowledge, the result has not been mentioned in previous analyses of
¯scal federalism, which resort to a uniformity-externality trade-o®. The paper complements
earlier political-economy research on the merits of (de)centralization (Lockwood, 2002, and
Besley and Coate, 2003). Therein, the equilibrium policy entails regionally di®erentiated
public good bundles. The welfare trade-o® follows di®erently from the political-economy
de¯ciencies of centralized systems weighed up against the failure of internalization in de-
centralized systems.4 Relative welfare may not vary monotonically with the strength of
consumption spillovers. The ¯nding re°ects ine±ciencies inherent either to the formation of
minimum winning coalitions or to the strategic delegation of politicians to a central legis-
lature. Both types of political de¯ciencies are absent in our model. Instead, we resort to
an archetypical model of ¯scal federalism hypothesizing benevolent governments; a setting
4Interestingly, the contributions point to a normative interpretation of Oates' uniformity assumption. With
a centralized legislature, an exogenously imposed policy uniformity requirement potentially enhances welfare
(as policy uniformity reduces the incentives for pork-barrel spending).
3which is most susceptible to predicting a monotone uniformity-externality trade-o®.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The
welfare analysis of (de)centralization is provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Private Sector Consider 2 regions each being inhabited by a representative household
whose preferences are de¯ned over private and public consumption and are quasi-linear in
private consumption, ui(ci;Gi) = ci + µiv(Gi) where µi > 0. v(Gi) is continuously di®eren-
tiable and satis¯es v0(Gi) > 0, v00(Gi) < 0, and limGi!0 v0(Gi) = 1. Private consumption
ci equals the endowment Ii minus taxes levied by the government ti, ci = Ii ¡ ti. Public
consumption in region i is
Gi = gi + ®gj; i 6= j:
Region i bene¯ts from resources spent on public consumption in the neighbor state at a rate
® 2 [0;1).5 Regions di®er with respect to preferences for public consumption. The preference
type of a region is denoted by superscripts h and l with µh > µl > 0.6
Public Sector There are two types of policy regimes. With a central legislature we assume
that public good are uniformly provided as conjectured by Oates (1972). Rather than impos-
ing uniform policy choices, we could alternatively treat policy uniformity as an endogenous,
equilibrium outcome along the lines suggested by Klibano® and Poitevin (1999).7
5We refrain from a pure public good (® = 1), not because it is less important, but because policy uniformity
would be inherently related to the nature of the public good, rather than a de¯ciency of a central legislature.
6A perfect separation of preference types may follow from Tiebout-type sorting (Tiebout, 1956). The
analysis extends to heterogenous populations which imperfectly sort across regions; most straightforwardly
when the public good g
i is pure from region i's perspective. In this case µ
i captures the average preference
type in region i.
7To grasp the intuition, assume the central government has access to non-uniform taxes and transfers, but -
following Oates (1972) - it lacks information on local preferences. In such a framework, local governments have
an incentive not to self-select into tax-transfer programs whenever they expect the central government to adjust
its policy subsequent to the truthful revelation of information. Local governments may misrepresent preference-
4The central government's choice of public expenditures g follows from8
max
g Ih + Il ¡ 2t + (µh + µl)v ((1 + ®)g) s.t. t = g:
The ¯rst-order condition is
(1 + ®)¹ µv0 ((1 + ®)g) = 1; (1)
where ¹ µ := µh+µl
2 . (1) implicitly de¯nes the optimal level of public expenditure, denoted by ~ g,
as a continuous function of ®;µh and µl. The policy choice re°ects the expenditure spillover
®. Due to the uniform provision of public goods, it is however only optimal for a hypothetical
region endowed with average preferences ¹ µ.
With decentralization, each region independently determines its most preferred level of
public expenditure. Taking the policy of the neighbor state gj as given, the government in
region i solves
max
gi Ii ¡ ti + µiv(gi + ®gj) s.t. gi = ti; i 6= j:
In public good contribution games, agents may optimally decide not to contribute to the
public good; even when v0(Gi) goes to in¯nity as Gi becomes small (Bergstrom et al., 1986).




i=1;2. In such equilibria, both contribution
margins adjust in response to a rise in the amount of spillovers, and the induced change in
the e±ciency cost of decentralization (due to free-riding) is presumably most pronounced.
Finding that the di®erence in utility of centralization and decentralization is non-monotone
in the strength spillovers is possibly most unexpected in this setting. At an interior solution,
the ¯rst-order condition
µiv0(gi + ®gj) = 1; i 6= j; (2)
yields the optimal best-response as a continuous function of ®;µi and gj, i.e. ¹ gi = ri ¡
gj;®;µi¢
.
Mutually consistency of responses requires that ¹ gi = ri ¡
¹ gj;®;µi¢
and ¹ gj = rj ¡
¹ gi;®;µj¢
related information; most notably the low preference region which would otherwise become a signi¯cant net-
contributor to the federal tax-transfer scheme. The strategic behavior coerces the federal government to
uniformly provide public services.
8Regionally-di®erentiated tax rates do not change the analysis as preferences are quasi-linear in private
consumption.
5where ¹ gi ¡
®;µi;µj¢
; ¹ gj ¡
®;µi;µj¢
is the Nash equilibrium. The policy choices adapt to regional
preferences, but fail to account for the spillover. Straightforwardly, the public good will be
under-consumed in a Nash equilibrium when ® 2 (0;1).
3 Evaluating Relative Welfare
In this section, we formally revisit the question of how consumption spillovers in°uence the
relative merit of (de)centralization. The optimal policy choices (1) and (2) may con¯rm
the predominant view that demand for centralization widens as the consumption spillover







1¡´G1¡´ ´ 2 R+ n f1g
lnG ´ = 1
: (3)
´ is the elasticity of the marginal utility of public consumption, ¡v00(G) G
v0(G). The sim-
pli¯cation is adopted for expositional clarity as it allows for a transparent and tractable
characterization of how the curvature of v(G) in°uences relative welfare.
The ¯rst-order conditions (1) and (2) yield as closed-form solutions of the equilibrium
public expenditure levels
~ g =











1 ¡ ®2 ; i 6= j: (4)
The contribution level of the low-preference region, ¹ gl, may violate the non-negativity con-


























; i 6= j: (6)
The ¯rst term describes region i's utility change due to the adjustment in its contribution
to the public good. Invoking the envelope theorem, the welfare e®ect vanishes. The second
6term captures a utility gain. Keeping contribution levels constant, region i is able to bene¯t
more amply from region j's public expenditures as ® increases. Important for the subsequent
analysis, the bene¯cial e®ect is more pronounced the larger the level of public expenditure in
region j. The last term re°ects how region j's adjustment in the contribution to the public
good in°uences region i's welfare. Inserting @¹ ui=@® = µiv0( ¹ Gi)¹ gj, @¹ ui=@¹ gj = ® and, from
(2), v0( ¹ Gi) = 1=µi into (6), the change in region i's utility simpli¯es to
d¹ ui
d®
= gj + ®
d¹ gj
d®
; i 6= j: (7)
Using (7), the change in welfare under decentralization Wd = ¹ uh + ¹ ul is
dWd
d®









¹ gh + ¹ gl
1 + ®
; (8)
where the last equation follows from di®erentiating ¹ gl and ¹ gh w.r.t. ® (see (4)), inserting the
derivatives into the ¯rst equation, and rearranging terms.
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@(~ uh + ~ ul)
@®
: (9)
The ¯rst term re°ects the virtue of centralization to account for spillovers. A higher
spillover renders public consumption more valuable from a social perspective and, in conse-
quence, the central government adjusts spending levels. Applying the envelope theorem, the
policy response proves neutral for aggregate welfare. The remaining term represents a welfare
gain. For given expenditure levels, both regions can more amply bene¯t from the neighbor
region's public expenditures in response to larger spillovers. Thus, the utility rise is larger the
larger the expenditure level chosen by the central government. Inserting @~ ui=@® = µiv0( ~ G)~ g
7and, from (1), v0( ~ G) = 1=
¡¹ µ(1 + ®)
¢
















¹ gh + ¹ gl
´´
: (11)
Hence, the di®erence between welfare under centralization and decentralization relates
to the di®erence in public outlays under both modes of ¯scal decision-making. It increases
(decreases) if, and only if, public expenditures under centralization, 2~ g, exceed (fall short of)
public expenditures under decentralization, ¹ gh + ¹ gl.
Expenditure levels will most notably depend on the curvature of the utility function v(G)
(parameterized by ´) and the amount of spillovers (parameterized by ®). As shown in the
appendix, decentralized policy choices yield a higher level of public expenditures if, and only
if, spillovers and the elasticity of marginal utility are su±ciently small. Formally,






, and ´ < 1. For all other admissible combinations of ® and ´, public expendi-
tures satisfy 2~ g ¸ ¹ gh + ¹ gl.
Intuitively, when spillovers are small, the insensitivity of central policy to local prefer-
ences yields a level of expenditure which lies in between the levels the low-type region and
high-type region choose non-cooperatively, i.e. ¹ gl < ~ g < ¹ gh. Furthermore, when v0(G) does
not drop too fast (i.e. ´ < 1) and thereby the demand for public consumption is su±ciently
elastic, the expenditure level, which a high-type region selects non-cooperatively, signi¯cantly
exceeds the uniform level, ¹ gh À ~ g. Aggregate expenditures are consequently higher in the
uncoordinated equilibrium, ¹ gh + ¹ gl > 2~ g. In all other cases, centralized policy choices yield











Figure 1: The sign of dW=d® as a function of ® and ´.
weakly higher levels of public spending.9
Recalling (11), we can state:
Proposition 1: Assume preferences for public consumption to be iso-elastic.
(i) For ´ < 1 a marginal rise in spillovers decreases (increases) the welfare di®erential W
provided spillovers are small (large).
(ii) For ´ ¸ 1 a marginal rise in spillovers weakly increases the welfare di®erential W
independently of the magnitude of spillovers.
Figure 1 illustrates the set of ®-values which yields a negative slope of W with respect to
®. The underlying preference parameters are µl = 2 and µh = 7. For all combinations (®;´)
above the thin, upward-sloping line both regions choose a positive contribution to the public
good. The solid, downward-sloping line partitions the space according to the sign of dW=d®.
Note, the ¯gure is restricted to ´ · 1. For ´ > 1 the sign of dW=d® is unambiguously positive
(independent of the magnitude of ®) - see part (ii) of Proposition 1.
9The quali¯cation \weakly" refers to the generic case of logarithmic utility (´ = 1) and the absence of
spill-overs (® = 0). For this parameter combination, both modes of ¯scal decision-making are equivalent in
terms of aggregate spending.
9At this point, it might be informative to relate the paper more ¯rmly to the literature
on (de)centralization. Existing analyses use preference functions which tend to suppress the
identi¯ed non-monotonicity of the welfare di®erence - either because preferences lack con-
cavity or they are logarithmic in public consumption. For instance, Lockwood (2002) and
Rubinchik-Pessach (2004) assume additively linear preferences (´ = 0) in their analysis of
discrete public good provision. Continuous solutions to the governments' optimization prob-
lems do not exist for this class of preferences which precludes the computation of dW=d®.
Di®erently, Besley and Coate (2003) use quasi-linear, logarithmic utility (´ = 1). With uni-
form central policies, the non-monotonicity of W in ® evaporates for this type of preferences
- see part (ii) of Proposition 1.
From a policy perspective, a crucial question is whether the non-monotonicity of the
welfare di®erence W yields a non-monotone sign of W, i.e. whether W is negative for small
spillovers, becomes positive for larger values, and afterwards switches back to a negative
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´
: (13)
Since at ® = 0 decentralization is welfare-superior (i.e. W < 0), the sign of W changes only
at some positive level of spillovers. (13) shows that W slopes upward at any switching point,
10changing its sign from negative to positive. Given that W is continuous in ®10, the W-curve
crosses the 0-line at most once. Consequently, the sign of W is monotonic.
Furthermore, we can show that a negatively-sloped welfare di®erential W does not exist





















The term in curly brackets is increasing in ®. Thus, if W slopes positively at some value of
®, it also slopes positively for larger values of ®. Combining the ¯nding with the result that
dW=d® > 0 at W = 0, we can conclude that dW=d® > 0 whenever W > 0. Summarizing the
results:
Proposition 2: A rise in the amount of spillovers may decrease the welfare di®erence
W only when decentralization is the optimal mode of ¯scal governance, i.e. W < 0. Thereby,
it will not justify a switch from centralization to decentralization.
Importantly, the preceding discussion shows that the non-monotonicity of W does not
invalidate the bottom line of the \Decentralization Theorem" that centralization (decentral-
ization) is welfare-superior when spillovers are su±ciently high (low).
4 Concluding Comments
The paper provides a formal treatment of how relative welfare with (de)centralized policy
relates to the strength of spillovers in public consumption. Most of the discussion on the costs
and bene¯ts of ¯scal federalism rests on a welfare trade-o® which is taken to be monotone in
the primitive of the economy. In contrast to the presumption, the analysis points to a non-
monotone trade-o®. A marginally higher degree of spillovers may promote the well-being of
constituents under decentralization compared with centralization.
10Note, public expenditure levels ¹ g
i and ~ g are continuous in ® - see (4). Thus, the welfare di®erential (12)
also varies continuously with ®.
11The analysis reveals that a non-monotonicity of W will only arise when decentralization
is welfare-enhancing. The ¯nding may not extend to models of ¯scal federalism which di®er
from the speci¯cation adopted in the paper. Suggestively, a non-monotone sign of W may
arise in models in which decentralization generates distortions beyond the failure to inter-
nalize spillovers or in which centralization exhibits allocative advantages in addition to the
internalization of spillovers. In these cases, the W-curve potentially shifts upward and mul-
tiple crossing points with the 0-line may exist. We leave a rigorous analysis of the reasoning
to future research.
A Appendix: Proof of Lemma
Following (4) and recalling the de¯nition ¹ µ :=
¡
µh + µl¢
=2, we can write
2~ g ¡
³
¹ gh + ¹ gl
´














































We next determine the sign of the expenditure di®erential for ´ < 1, ´ > 1 and ´ = 1
separately.
Consider ´ < 1. For ´ < 1 the function (¢)
1
















with 2~ g < ¹ gh + ¹ gl,
8® 2 [0;®¤).
Consider ´ > 1. Rearranging (14)
2~ g ¡
³

























For ´ > 1 the function (¢)
1












´ in (16) is increasing in ®. Following (16) and (17), we can conclude that
2~ g ¡
¡
¹ gh + ¹ gl¢








Consider ´ = 1. Given by (15), we have 2~ g = ¹ gh+¹ gl at ® = 0. Furthermore, the expression
in (14) is increasing in ®. Consequently, we get 2~ g ¡
¡
¹ gh + ¹ gl¢








Combining the results derived for ´ < 1, ´ > 1 and ´ = 1 completes the proof.
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